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Abstract
The present study aims at clarifying the nature of the Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits associated with Amyotrophic Lateral
Sclerosis (ALS). ToM is the ability to attribute mental states such as intentions and beliefs to others in order to understand
and predict their behaviour and to behave accordingly. Several neuroimaging studies reported the prefrontal cortices as the
brain region underlying a key ToM ability, i.e. the comprehension of social intentions. Dysfunction of the prefrontal cortices
in patients with ALS has been indicated by a range of neuroimaging studies. The frontal syndrome that appears to
characterize up to 50% of ALS has been noted to be similar to the profile that characterizes patients with frontotemporal
dementia (FTD), a neurodegenerative condition characterised by ToM deficits. In the present paper, we hypothesize that the
performance of patients with ALS is significantly worse than healthy controls’ performance on tasks requiring the
comprehension of social contexts, whereas patients’ performance is comparable to healthy controls’ performance on tasks
not requiring the comprehension of social contexts. To this end, we tested 15 patients with ALS with an experimental
protocol that distinguishes between private (non-social) intentions and social intentions. The pattern of results followed the
experimental hypothesis: the performance of patients with ALS and healthy controls significantly differed on the
comprehension of social context only, with an impairment in patients with ALS. Single case analysis confirmed the findings
at an individual level. The present study is the first which has examined and compared the understanding of social and non-
social contexts in patients with ALS and shown a specific and selective deficit in the former only. The current findings further
support the notion of a continuum of cognitive dysfunction ranging from ALS to FTD, with parallel cognitive profiles in both
disorders.
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Introduction
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) involves the progressive
degeneration of upper and lower motor neurones. ALS has
traditionally been considered as a neurodegenerative condition
affecting exclusively the motor system, with no repercussions on
the cognitive domain. However, numerous studies have now
challenged this view, demonstrating the presence of significant
cognitive impairment predominantly in the realm of executive
functions in a significant proportion of ALS patients, and in
language functions in some patients [1–5]. In keeping with this,
structural and functional neuroimaging has demonstrated that
ALS is associated with abnormalities localized mainly in the
frontal lobes [6–10], and neuropathological investigations have
shown the pathological involvement of prefrontal cortices [11].
The frontal syndrome that appears to characterize up to 50% of
ALS has been noted to be similar to the profile that characterizes
patients with frontotemporal dementia (FTD). Moreover, 5–15%
of ALS patients develop a full blown FTD. FTD is the currently
preferred term to describe non-Alzheimer type dementia involving
mainly the frontotemporal regions of the cerebral cortex [12–13].
A link has been established between ALS and FTD on
neuropathological [14–16], neuroimaging [10,17] and cognitive
[18] grounds. More precisely, it has been proposed that ALS may
represent a point on a clinical continuum ranging from ALS,
ALS/FTD through to FTD [10,19].
FTD is characterised by deficits in social cognition and changes
in social behaviour, and processes of Theory of Mind (ToM) are
now recognised as fundamentally impaired in the disease (for
reviews see [20–21]). ToM can be defined as the ability to attribute
mental states such as intentions and beliefs to others in order to
understand and predict their behaviour and to behave accordingly
[22–23], and it has been recently proposed that the severe social
and behavioural problems that often characterize FTD may at
least partially be the result of a significant impairment in ToM.
This may contribute to patients’ difficulty in understanding and
managing social interactions appropriately [20,24].
While there are a significant number of studies on the ToM
abilities in FTD, to the best of our knowledge only three studies
have directly investigated ToM abilities in patients with ALS [25–
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27]. Gibbons and colleagues [25] used cartoons and stories that
require participants to attribute mental states to others, as well as
some that pertain to physical events. The analysis of individual
patients’ results revealed a heterogeneous range of performance
ranging from normal to severely impaired. Furthermore, the
qualitative analysis of the results showed that the errors made by
the patients with ALS were similar to the ones made by patients
with FTD [28] although, due to the demanding nature of the tasks
used, it is possible that executive dysfunction may have been at the
root of the reported deficit. More recently, Girardi et al. [26]
described deficits in ALS patients on a test of Judgement of
Preference based on eye gaze. This task is a simple undemanding
test of ToM and only some of the patients who were impaired on
this test also showed evidence of executive dysfunction. The
finding that this simple ToM task detected a deficit in more ALS
patients than standard tests of executive function suggests an
impairment in inferring the mental state of another based on a
simple social cue, which is over and above a deficit in executive
functions. Furthermore, these authors used the Reading the Mind
in the Eyes task, a test consisting in the presentation of
photographs of the eye region of human faces, and reported a
trend towards significantly lower accuracy scores in ALS patients
compared to controls. An altered social awareness and a difficulty
in identifying the presence of a faux pas in social situations was
reported by a recent study of Meier and colleagues [27]. They
used the Faux Pas Test, a test evaluating the affective component
of ToM, in which it is essential to understand whether in a social
situation somebody said something that they should not have said.
Their analysis of individual data revealed that six of 18 patients
with ALS were significantly impaired on the faux pas condition
and showed a classical dissociation with the control condition.
The present study aims at clarifying the nature of the ToM
deficits associated with ALS. We used an experimental protocol
deriving from a theoretical taxonomy of intentions proposed in a
series of our fMRI studies [29–32]. These studies demonstrated
that the prefrontal cortices are not necessarily involved in the
understanding of other people’s intentions per se, but primarily in
the understanding of the intentions of people who are currently
involved in social interaction, or who are preparing for future social
interaction (i.e. when a given social interaction is foreseen, but has
not yet occurred). This experimental protocol clearly distinguishes
between private (non-social) intentions and social intentions.
Private intentions involve the representation of a private goal,
i.e. a goal involving only the actor satisfying that particular goal
(e.g. working in the kitchen to prepare oneself a meal). Conversely,
social intentions involve the representation of a social goal, i.e. a
goal of an actor (A) that implies at least another person (B), who is
a necessary element for satisfying that goal. In a previous study
involving two small groups of FTD and Alzheimer’s disease
patients [33], we used stories requiring both the comprehension of
social contexts and the comprehension of non-social contexts.
Interestingly, patients’ performance on the social stories was
significantly worse than their performance on non-social stories.
As the prefrontal cortices play a crucial role in both the ALS
neuropathology [11] and in the understanding of social interac-
tions (a key ToM ability impaired in FTD, [33]), then one may
expect impairment to be present in the realms of social
understanding in ALS as well. In the present study we use the
same social understanding tasks used in our previous study [33].
We hypothesized that the performance of patients with ALS will
be significantly worse than healthy controls’ performance on tasks
requiring the comprehension of social contexts, whereas patients’
performance will be comparable to healthy controls’ performance
on tasks not requiring the comprehension of social contexts.
Methods
1. Ethics Statement
Informed written consent was obtained from all of the
participants or from a patient’s caregiver if the patient was unable
to write. The study was granted approval by the Lothian NHS
Research Ethics Committee and was conducted in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki.
2. Participants
The present study involved 15 patients with ALS and 21 healthy
controls. Patients with ALS (11 males and 4 females, age range 27–
83, mean 59.07617.60 years, educational level 14.9363.75 years,
mean duration of illness to time of testing 2.6861.61 years) were
retrospectively recruited through the Western General Hospital of
Edinburgh (UK), Department of Clinical Neurosciences. Exclusion
criteria were the additional presence of other neurological and/or
psychiatric disorders such as traumatic brain injuries, strokes or
psychosis, or a positive history of alcohol or drug abuse, as well as
the presence of significant sensorial impairments and/or extremely
severe communication problems that could seriously compromise
both the administration of cognitive tests and the interpretation of
the relative results. According to the international published criteria
[34–35], the patients clinically showed the presence of upper and
lower motor neuron signs, and a definite or probable diagnosis of
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Six patients showed the presence of
bulbar signs (i.e. the clinically evident involvement of mouth, tongue
and throat), whereas 9 patients showed no presence of these signs at
the time of testing. Only one of the former patients showed the
presence of bulbar signs at the onset of the disease (bulbar onset),
whereas the other patients presented with a limb onset.
Healthy controls (14 males and 7 females, age range 29–77,
mean 57.48612.91 years, educational level 17.0264.15 years)
were recruited from a panel of healthy volunteers held by the
Department of Psychology at the University of Edinburgh (UK).
None of them were related to the patients with ALS involved in
the present study, and through a brief clinical interview based on
the one reported by Green [36], it was established that none of
them had a positive history of neurological and/or psychiatric
disorders, or of alcohol or drug abuse.
3. General neuropsychological assessment
All of the participants were administered the Graded Naming
test (GNT, [37]) to assess their naming ability. Visuospatial
abilities were assessed by three subtests of the Visual Object and
Space Perception Battery (VOSP, [38]): ‘Object Decision’,
‘Position Discrimination’, and ‘Number Location’. Executive tasks
included both timed and untimed tests. Timed tests encompassed
letter (P, R, W) and category (animals) spoken verbal fluency tasks
(1 minute), as well as the Hayling Sentence Completion test [39].
As an untimed executive test, participants were finally asked to
perform the Brixton Spatial Anticipation test [39]. For the verbal
fluency tasks, a verbal fluency index was calculated [2,40], in order to
control for variation in motor speed: more precisely, participants
were first required to generate as many words as possible
according to the specific instructions of the various tasks (word
generation condition), and then participants were required to read
aloud the same words (word read condition). The verbal fluency
index (Vfi) was calculated as follows: Vfi = (Time for Word
Generation Condition-Time for Word Copy/Read Condition)/
Total Number of Words Generated.
For all of the timed tests, digital recording and the software
Praat [41] or a chronometer were used in order to accurately
define the time employed by each participant.
Social Understanding in ALS
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4. Neuropsychiatric and functional assessment
4.1. Neuropsychiatric assessment. Emotional disturbances
were investigated by administering the Hospital Anxiety and Depression
Scale (HADS, [42]), a brief self-assessment scale that provides a
measure of severity of anxiety and depression, adapted for ALS,
with the removal of one statement (‘‘I feel as if I am slowed down’’)
[2].
4.2. Functional assessment. Two measures were employed
to monitor the level of functional abilities in patients with ALS.
The Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis Functional Rating Scale–Revised
(ALSFRS-R, [43]) is a validated clinical rating scale widely used
to identify and follow over time the progression of patients’
functional impairment. In addition, patients’ daytime somnolence
was specifically assessed by the Epworth Sleepiness Scale [44], a
phenomenon that may be associated with the presence of
breathing disorders, and which may affect cognitive performance
[45].
5. Theory of Mind tasks
Two ToM tasks were used in the present study. The Reading
the Mind in the Eyes task (RME, [46]) consists of the presentation
of 36 black and white photographs of the eye region of both male
and female human faces. Participants were required to choose
which of four words (printed below the pictures), best describes
what the person in the photograph is thinking or feeling. A control
task [47–48], designed to investigate participants’ ability to
correctly identify human physical attributes such as gender, was
undertaken subsequently. Participants provided verbal responses
and could take as long as they wanted to respond. The RME is a
well used test of ToM, but does not require the comprehension of
social situations. If a deficit in ALS is specific to the understanding
of social situations then no differences should emerge between the
performance of ALS patients’ and healthy controls’.
The second ToM task is a story completion task presented in a
comic strip form that consists of 36 comic strip stories belonging to
two theoretical dimensions derived by Ciaramidaro et al. [29]:
Social Contexts (SC), and Non-Social Contexts (N-SC). The SC
dimension includes prospective social interaction and communi-
cative interaction, and consists of 18 stories depicting both actions
with a social goal performed by a single character where a social
interaction is foreseen but has not actually taken place (e.g. a single
person preparing a romantic dinner), and actions with a social goal
performed by two characters in a communicative interaction (e.g.
a person obtaining a glass of water by asking another person to get
it for her). The N-SC dimension includes stories in which no social
interactions are shown, and consists of 9 stories depicting actions
performed by a single character with a private goal outside a social
interaction (e.g. a single person changing a broken bulb in order to
read a book), and 9 stories depicting physical interactions between
objects (e.g. a ball blown by a gust of wind knocking over and
breaking a glass of water). According to Ciaramidaro and
colleagues [29], the stories belonging to the SC dimension require
the attribution of social intentions as they concern a social
interaction that occurs at the present time or in the future, whereas
the stories belonging to the N-SC dimension do not require the
attribution of social intentions as they do not concern a social
interactions between characters.
Each story consisted of three consecutive pictures (Development
Phase), followed by a choice between four concluding pictures
(Response Phase). In the Development Phase the first and second
pictures established a story setting and introduced the characters
or the objects involved, while the third picture represented the
social or non-social action. In the Response Phase, the correct picture
represented a probable and congruent effect resulting from the
Development Phase, while the incorrect pictures represented an
improbable or incongruent effect. Examples of the stories can be
found at the following web address: www.psych.unito.it/csc/pers/
adenzato/pdf/neurodegdis.pdf.
The story completion task includes a number of important
features. Firstly, the stimuli depict simple, high-frequency actions
(e.g. pointing towards an object). Secondly, the three drawings that
compose each story in the Development Phase remained in front
of the participants, so reducing the memory load and allowing
them to go back to the story whenever needed during the
Response Phase. Lastly, in administering the task, no explicit
instructions to pay attention to the nature of the context (social or
non-social) were provided, avoiding any direct reference to the
characters’ intentions. A validation process that involved 33
university students and 33 older adults, conducted prior to the
beginning of the present study, enabled the authors to improve the
quality of the drawings and the clarity of the social/non-social
contexts depicted.
The stories were displayed on a 15.4’’ WXGA computer screen
using the software Presentation 11.0 (Neurobehavioral Systems,
Albany, CA, USA). The seating was arranged so that the
participants sat in a comfortable chair approximately 0.5 metres
from the screen. The first picture of the Development Phase was
displayed alone for four seconds in the upper left corner of the
screen. Then, the second picture appeared close to the first one.
After four seconds, the third picture of the story appeared in the
upper right corner of the screen, close to the other two.
Participants were asked to look at each story carefully. After four
seconds, four possible completions of the story appeared at the
same time for 20 seconds below the story pictures (Response
Phase). Participants were then required to choose verbally the
most appropriate ending of the story amongst the four alternatives
provided as fast as they could, by saying aloud the number (1, 2, 3
or 4) associated with the alternative chosen. Given the clinical
target involved in the study (patients affected by motor
impairments), this paradigm was chosen in order to reduce as
much as possible the involvement of the motor domain: for each
story, they were required to say aloud only the number associated
with their choice. Both their verbal responses and related reaction
times were recorded via a sensitive microphone (headphones and
microphone two-in-one headset, GEMBIRD) connected to the
notebook. Lastly, a control task was proposed in order to take into
account participants’ verbal speed of reaction. Eighteen stories
randomly chosen were presented again according to the same
procedure for six seconds each. However, this time one of the
alternatives was completely blank. Participants were instructed to
look at the four alternatives provided and to say aloud the number
associated with the blank picture as fast as they could.
6. Statistical analyses
Graphical and statistical exploration of the data by means of
box plots, histograms, Q-Q plots and normality tests indicated a
normal distribution for most measures, hence parametric tests
were used. Non-parametric analyses were undertaken for the
VOSP subtests. Statistical analyses were as follows: firstly, group
comparisons between patients with ALS and healthy controls on
the background (i.e. neuropsychological and neuropsychiatric
measures) and experimental (i.e. ToM tasks) variables of interest
were performed using unpaired t-tests, Mann-Whitney U-tests or
repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), as appropri-
ate. Secondly, in order to detect the possible influence of bulbar
signs on cognitive performance [25,40,49–50], two subgroups of
patients with ALS were identified according to the presence of
bulbar signs at the time of testing, and the comparisons among
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patients with bulbar signs, patients without bulbar signs and
healthy controls were performed using one-way and repeated
measures ANOVAs, as appropriate. Thirdly, comparisons of
individual patients’ and healthy controls’ scores on the background
neuropsychological and ToM measures were performed using
single case methodology [51–53]: more precisely, modified t-tests
were used to determine whether each individual’s scores were
significantly lower than the corresponding healthy control group’s
scores.
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS version 18.0
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences).
Results
1. ALS patients versus healthy controls
1.1. General neuropsychological assessment. The two
groups were well matched for age (t(34) = 0.313, not significant,
NS) and level of education (t(34)= 1.550, NS). Scores were
expressed as raw scores, with the exception of the Hayling and
Brixton tests, for which scaled scores were used. The comparisons
between the performance of the two groups are shown in Table 1.
Patients with ALS performed worse than healthy controls on the
Verbal Fluency letters (t(34) = 3.079, p,0.01), the Verbal Fluency
Index (t(34) = 3.254, p,0.01) and the GNT (t(34) = 4.378,
p,0.01). No statistically significant differences were found on
the other neuropsychological measures.
1.2. General neuropsychiatric and functional assessment.
The ALSFRS-R allows researchers and clinicians to detect the
possible presence of limb, bulbar and respiratory dysfunction. The
patients’ mean score was 31.3367.31 (range: 17–41), and clinically
patients varied significantly regarding their level of functional
capacities, with nine of them presenting with upper and lower limbs
involvement only whereas six patients presented with bulbar signs at
the time of testing. The respiratory subscore of the ALSFRS-R
combines three questions on Dyspnea, Orthopnea and Respiratory
Efficiency. Each question is rated out of a maximum of 4 (4 being
normal function) and hence producing a total maximum of 12. Our
total patient group had a mean score of 10.5961.5 (range: 8–12).
Hence although some patients had some symptoms of respiratory
compromise, this was not marked in any of the patients tested.
The mean score for the Epworth Sleepiness Scale was
5.0961.87 (range: 2–8, clinical cut-off: 10), and no one reported
a clinically significant level of sleepiness. Regarding the HADS,
five patients did not perform the scale due to time constraints. The
two subscales measuring anxiety and depression respectively did
not show the presence of a significant difference between the two
groups (anxiety: t(30) = 0.793, NS; depression: t(30) = 1.354, NS),
and no patients showed the presence of clinically significant
levels of these emotional disorders (anxiety: patients with ALS=
3.9162.26, healthy controls = 4.6762.71; borderline range: 8–10;
depression: patients with ALS=1.8262.27, healthy controls =
0.9561.36; borderline range: 8–10).
1.3. Theory of Mind tasks. RME: The number of correct
responses for both the experimental (mental states attribution) and
the control (gender attribution) tasks were considered. The range
of possible scores varied between 0 and 36. Unpaired t-tests
revealed the absence of significant differences on both the
experimental (patients with ALS= 25.2564.89, healthy controls
27.0064.46: t(34) = 0.659, NS) and the control (patients with
ALS= 34.7561.06, healthy controls 34.9561.40: t(34) = 0.353,
NS) tasks.
Story Completion Task: Both correct responses and their
associated reaction times were analyzed. The number of correct
responses for each dimension (SC and N-SC) was considered, and
the range of possible scores varied between 0 and 18 for each
dimension. A repeated measures ANOVA involving the two
groups (patients with ALS and healthy controls) and the two
dimensions (N-SC and SC) showed the presence of a statistically
significant main effect of group (F(1, 34) = 15.892, p,0.001) and a
group x dimension interaction (F(1, 34) = 10.221, p,0.01). Post-
hoc paired sample t-tests showed that the performance on the SC
dimension was significantly worse in patients with ALS than in
healthy controls (t(34) = 3.916, p,0.001), whereas the perfor-
mance of the two groups on the N-SC dimension did not differ
significantly (t(34) 0.813, NS), therefore supporting the experi-
mental hypothesis. Figure 1 shows graphically these comparisons.
Table 1. Performance of ALS patients and healthy controls on the background neuropsychological tests.
ALS patients Mean (SD)
Healthy controls mean
(SD) t-test or Mann-Whitney U
(n=15) (n =21)
Verbal Fluency: Letters P, R, W (total) 39.53 (14.08) 52.33 (10.87) 3.079*
Verbal Fluency: Index 4.37 (1.85) 2.85 (0.52) 3.254*
Verbal Fluency: Category (total) 18.80 (5.61) 22.05 (4.10) NS
GNT (0–30) 21.87 (3.38) 26.10 (2.43) 4.378*
VOSP: ‘‘Object Decision’’ (0–20) 18.00 (1.60) 18.29 (1.76) NS
VOSP: ‘‘Position Discrimination’’ (0–20) 19.93 (0.26) 19.81 (0.40) NS
VOSP: ‘‘Number Location’’ (0–10) 9.27 (0.89) 9.62 (0.97) NS
Hayling: ‘‘Overall’’ (1–10) 5.60 (1.24) 6.05 (1.20) NS
Hayling: ‘‘Sensible Completion’’ (1–7) 5.60 (1.06) 6.05 (0.50) NS
Hayling: ‘‘Unconnected Completion’’ (1–8) 5.47 (1.36) 5.76 (0.89) NS
Hayling: Errors (1–8) 6.13 (1.41) 6.33 (1.83) NS
Brixton (1–10) 6.87 (2.07) 7.10 (1.84) NS
GNT=Graded Naming Test; NS = not significant; SD = standard deviation; VOSP = Visual Object and Space Perception battery.
*p,0.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025948.t001
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The comparison in the ALS group of the two types of non-social
stories resulted in a statistically significant difference (physical
interaction 8.7360.46, private intention 7.7361.03, one-sample t-
test: 8.489, p,0.001). The comparison in the ALS group of the
score on the private intention stories with the averaged score on
the social stories resulted in a statistically significant difference
(private intention 7.7361.03; averaged social stories: 6.9361.37,
one-sample t-test: 3.013, p,0.001).
In the analysis of the reaction times, only the reaction times
associated with the correct responses were considered. A repeated
measures ANOVA involving the two groups (patients with ALS
and healthy controls) and the reaction times associated with the
two dimensions of interest (SC and N-SC) showed a statistically
significant group effect (F(1, 34) 4.876, p,0.05) but not a
significant interaction effect (F(1, 34) 0.208, NS), meaning that
patients required more time to perform items belonging to both
dimensions, compared with healthy controls.
For the control task, all participants scored the maximum of 18
correct responses, thus all reaction times were considered in the
following analysis. A t-test performed on the reaction times of the
task did not show a significant difference between the two groups
(t(34) 0.634, NS), indicating that the ALS patients reported here
did not have significantly slowed responding in comparison to
controls despite the presence of bulbar dysfunction in some
patients.
To conclude, we still investigated possible significant correla-
tions between the scores of the verbal fluency task (letters), the
GNT and the story completion task, that were the only tasks that
differed across groups. The verbal fluency task and the GNT were
significantly correlated to each other (Spearman’s r=0.459,
p,0.01), whereas no significant correlations were found between
the verbal fluency task or the GNT and the story completion task.
2. Patients with bulbar signs vs. patients with no bulbar
signs vs. healthy controls
2.1. General neuropsychological assessment. The three
groups were well matched for age (F(2, 33) 0.546, NS) and level of
education (F (2, 33) 2.429, NS). The comparison between the
performance of the three groups on the background
neuropsychological measures, as well as their demographic data,
are shown in Table 2.
2.2. General neuropsychiatric and functional assess-
ment. On the ALSFRS-R, the difference between the two
subgroups was statistically significant (bulbar patients 26.6768.50,
non-bulbar patients 34.4464.59, t(13) 2.312, p,0.05), with bulbar
patients showing a higher degree of functional impairment. On the
Epworth Sleepiness Scale the two subgroups of patients did not
show any significant difference (bulbar patients 5.0061.00, non-
bulbar patients 5.1262.17, t(13) 0.094, NS). Lastly, the two
subscales from the HADS measuring anxiety (bulbar patients
2.6762.31, non-bulbar patients 4.3762.20, healthy controls
4.6762.71) and depression (bulbar patients 1.6762.08, non-
bulbar patients 1.8762.47, healthy controls 0.9561.36) did not
show the presence of a significant difference between the three
groups (anxiety: F(2, 29) 0.797, NS; depression: F(2, 29) 0.902,
NS).
2.3. Theory of Mind tasks. RME: There were no significant
differences between the three groups for the experimental (F(2, 33)
0.556, NS) or control (F(2, 33) 0.181, NS) RME tasks.
Story Completion Task: A repeated measures ANOVA
involving the three groups (bulbar patients, non-bulbar patients
and healthy controls) and the two dimensions (N-SC and SC)
showed the presence of a statistically significant main effect of
group (F(2, 34) 19.353, p,0.001) and a group x dimension
interaction (F(2, 34) 4.974, p,0.05). Post-hoc paired sample t-tests
showed that the performance of both groups of patients on the SC
dimension was significantly worse than in healthy controls (bulbar
patients versus healthy controls: t(25) 3.084, p,0.01; non-bulbar
patients versus healthy controls: t(28) 2.851, p,0.05), whereas the
performance of the two groups of patients on the N-SC dimension
did not differ significantly from healthy controls. Table 3 shows the
comparisons of interest. Regarding their reaction times, a repeated
measures ANOVA involving the three groups (bulbar patients,
non-bulbar patients and healthy controls) and the two dimensions
(N-SC and SC) did not show the presence of statistically significant
Figure 1. Participants’ performance on the story completion task (range of possible values for both the N-SC and SC dimensions: 0–
18). N-SC Non-Social items; SC Social items. * p,0.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025948.g001
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group (F(2, 34) 1.559, NS) or interaction (F(2, 34) 0.615, NS)
effects.
3. Individual patients versus healthy controls
3.1. General neuropsychological assessment. Comparison
of individual patient scores on the background neuropsychological
tests with healthy controls’ means using a modified t-test [51]
showed significantly lower scores on the verbal fluency letters in
patients 9 (t(21) 2.996, p,0.01), 6 (t(21) 2.187, p,0.05), 11 (t(21)
2.636, p,0.05), 12 (t(21) 2.726, p,0.05), 14 (t(21) 2.187, p,0.05),
and 15 (t(21) 2.187, p,0.05); on the verbal fluency category, in
patients 1 (t(21) 2.633, p,0.05), 2 (t(21) 2.633, p,0.05), 9 (t(21)
2.157, p,0.05), and 11 (t(21) 2.157, p,0.05). Furthermore, on the
GNT patients 2 (t(21) 3.257, p,0.01), 5 (t(21) 3.257, p,0.01), 7
(t(21) 3.257, p,0.01), 9 (t(21) 2.453, p,0.01), 10 (t(21) 2.855,
p,0.01), 11 (t(21) 3.257, p,0.01) and 12 (t(21) 2.453, p,0.01)
performed poorly, whereas on the VOSP Object Decision and
Position Discrimination subtests, patients’ performance was
equivalent to healthy controls’ performance. On the VOSP
Number Location’’, only patient 8 performed significantly worse
than controls (t(21) 2.639, p,0.05). Significant differences were
identified on the Hayling ‘‘overall’’ measure in patient 2 (t(21) 2.483,
p,0.05); on the Hayling ‘‘sensible completion’’, in patients 5 (t(21)
4.006, p,0.01), and 10 (t(21) 5.960, p,0.001); on the Hayling
‘‘unconnected completion’’, in patient 1 (t(21) 4.128, p,0.01); on
the Hayling ‘‘errors’’, in patient 2 (t(21) 2.312, p,0.05), and on the
Brixton test, in patient 6 (t(21) 2.708, p,0.05).
3.2. Theory of Mind tasks. Comparison of individual
patient scores with healthy controls’ mean [51] for the RME
task did not show the presence of any significant differences
between patients’ and healthy controls’ scores. Regarding the
RME control task, patients’ performance was equivalent to
healthy controls’ performance. Individual patient scores for the
experimental task, expressed as Z scores, are shown in Figure 2.
Table 2. Demographic data of ALS patients with no bulbar signs at the time of testing (i.e. non-bulbar), with bulbar signs at the
time of testing (i.e. bulbar) and healthy controls, and relative performance on the background neuropsychological tests.
Non-bulbar Bulbar Healthy controls
F or Kruskal-
Wallis H
(n 9) (n 6) (n 21)
Age in years 62.22 (17.64) 54.33 (18.02) 57.48 (12.91) NS
Gender (M:F) 7:2 4:2 14:7 -
Education in years 13.67 (3.20) 16.83 (3.96) 17.02 (4.15) NS
Verbal Fluency: letters P, R, W 40.22 (11.33) 38.50 (18.64) 52.33 (10.87) 4.646*
Verbal Fluency: Index 3.83 (1.27) 5.17 (2.38) 2.85 (0.52) 7.898**1
Verbal Fluency: Category 18.33 (6.60) 19.50 (4.18) 22.05 (4.10) NS
GNT (0–30) 21.44 (4.07) 22.50 (2.17) 26.10 (2.43) 9.680**"
VOSP: ‘‘Object Decision’’ (0–20) 17.44 (1.81) 18.83 (0.75) 18.29 (1.76) NS
VOSP: ‘‘Position Discrimination’’ (0–20) 20.00 (0.00) 19.83 (0.41) 19.81 (0.40) NS
VOSP: ‘‘Number Location’’ (0–10) 9.33 (0.71) 9.17 (1.17) 9.62 (0.97) NS
Hayling: ‘‘Overall’’ (1–10) 5.22 (1.20) 6.17 (1.17) 6.05 (1.20) NS
Hayling: ‘‘Sensible completion’’ (1–7) 5.33 (1.12) 6.00 (0.89) 6.05 (0.50) NS
Hayling: ‘‘Unconnected completion’’ (1–8) 5.11 (1.45) 6.00 (1.10) 5.76 (0.89) NS
Hayling: Errors (1–8) 5.89 (1.69) 6.50 (0.84) 6.33 (1.83) NS
Brixton (1–10) 5.89 (1.90) 8.33 (1.37) 7.10 (1.84) NS
GNT Graded Naming Test; NS not significant; SD standard deviation; VOSP Visual Object and Space Perception battery.
*p,0.05.
**p,0.001.
1Bulbar patients significantly different from healthy controls.
"Bulbar and non-bulbar patients significantly different from healthy controls.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025948.t002
Table 3. Performance on the ToM tasks (scores as correct responses).
Non-bulbar Bulbar Healthy controls F
(n 9) (n 6) (n 21)
RME experimental (0-36) 25.33 (3.46) 27.17 (4.26) 27.00 (4.46) NS
N-SC (0-18) 16.89 (0.78) 15.83 (1.72) 16.81 (1.21) NS
SC (0–18) 14.22 (3.07) 13.33 (2.34) 16.52 (1.25) 19.353*"
N-SC Non-social context; RME Reading the Mind in the Eyes; SC Social Context.
*p,0.001.
"Bulbar and non-bulbar patients significantly different from healthy controls.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025948.t003
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To investigate whether the patients’ performance on the SC items
was worse than their performance on the N-SC items, individual
patients’ difference scores between SC and N-SC stories (i.e. SC
score–N-SC score) were compared with healthy controls by means
of the revised standardised difference test [53]. The comparison
showed the presence of a difference in 12 out of 15 patients (80.00%)
in the direction stated by the experimental hypothesis (SC,N-SC)
and this difference was statistically significant in patients 2 (t(21)
4.962, p,0.001), 5 (t(21) 2.607, p,0.05) and 8 (t(21) 3.784,
p,0.001). Individual patients’ differences (SC–N-SC), expressed as
Z scores, are shown in Figure 3.
Discussion
The present study was aimed at investigating a specific ToM
ability, i.e. the ability of correctly interpreting social situations by
attributing intentions to others appropriately, and demonstrated
that ALS patients showed a specific deficit in understanding social
intentions. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study
which has examined and compared the understanding of social
and non-social contexts in patients with ALS and shown a specific
and selective deficit in the former only. This deficit is parallel to
that one found in a previous study of a small group of FTD
Figure 2. RME experimental test: Individual patients’ scores. RME Reading the Mind in the Eyes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025948.g002
Figure 3. Story completion task: Individual patients’ differences (SC–N-SC). N-SC Non-Social items; SC Social items. * p,0.05; ** p,0.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025948.g003
Social Understanding in ALS
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 October 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | e25948
patients [33]. The current finding further supports the notion of a
continuum of cognitive dysfunction ranging from ALS to FTD,
with parallel cognitive profiles in both disorders.
The pattern of results followed the experimental hypothesis:
more precisely, ALS patients’ performance on the non-social
stories was significantly better than their performance on the social
stories. This pattern of results was not found in healthy controls.
Furthermore, when the performance of the two groups was
directly compared, the performance of patients with ALS and
healthy controls significantly differed on the social element only
with an impairment in patients. Single case analysis confirmed the
previous findings at an individual level, with 12 of the 15 patients
showing the same direction of effect and three with clearly
abnormal performance significantly different from controls.
However, one caveat of this study is that the performance of the
healthy controls is approaching ceiling on both social and non-
social items, as is the performance of the ALS patients on the non-
social items. Therefore, it is possible that the social stories are
relatively more difficult than the non-social ones and future work
should address whether this is the case. The analysis of reaction
times revealed that even if patients with ALS were typically slower
than healthy controls throughout the task, the reaction times
associated with the execution of the non-social and social
dimensions did not differ from each other within each group of
participants.
The previous studies directly investigating ToM abilities in
patients with ALS have provided heterogeneous results [25–27].
While ALS patients were not significantly impaired on tasks
involving humorous cartoons and stories with mental and physical
scenarios [25], they were impaired on the Judgement of Preference
task, showed a trend towards significantly lower RME accuracy
scores [26] and were impaired in their ability to understand
behaviour in social situations using the Faux Pas task [27]. In this
latter study Meier and colleagues [27] found a specific effect of the
task, i.e., their ALS patients showed a poorer performance in
stories containing social interactions that involve a faux pas than in
the control stories in which the faux pas was removed. As in both
the faux pas and the control stories a social interactions is actually
involved, Meier et al. ’s study is only partially in line with the
present one, and thus we suggest that future research should aim at
better understanding what features of a social interaction make it
more difficult for ALS patients its comprehension (e.g., interaction
involving affective rather than cognitive components of ToM,
interaction that occurs at the present time rather than in the
future, and so on).
The main difference between the present study and the previous
ones in the literature is the focus we place on the ability to
comprehend social and non-social situations. For example,
Gibbons and colleagues [25] used a combination of social and
non-social situations in the same experimental category, without a
clear distinction between the presence or absence of social
interactions. Our results may differ from those reported in the
previous studies due to their failure to consider situations with both
social and non-social contexts. Moreover, Gibbons and colleagues
used humorous situations in both their mental and physical
conditions and, as suggested by the authors, a general problem in
reasoning and inferential capability contributed to their patients’
performance on both the mental and physical tasks.
One of the most currently debated issues in cognitive neurosci-
ence is whether the cognitive and neural processes involved in
perception, language, memory, and attention, actually suffice to
account for the ways in which we conduct our social interactions, or
whether there are specific brain structures and cognitive mecha-
nisms to cope with social complexity [54–56]. ToM represents one
of the key everyday-life complex abilities of understanding and
interpreting social situations in order to behave accordingly. Several
studies in both the neuropsychological [57–59] and neuroimaging
(see [60] for a review) literature reported the prefrontal cortices as a
key brain region underlying ToM. In particular, Walter et al. [31]
and Ciaramidaro et al. [29] via a series of fMRI experiments have
demonstrated that the medial prefrontal cortices are involved in
understanding the intentions of people involved in social interac-
tions (e.g. social intentions) but not in understanding the intentions
of people outside social interactions (e.g. private intentions).
Dysfunction of this region in patients with ALS has been indicated
by a range of neuroimaging studies [6–8].
It has been recently proposed that the social and behavioural
problems that often characterize frontal neurodegenerative
diseases such as FTD–i.e. alterations of patients’ social behaviour
and conduct in terms of disinhibition and loss of control or,
conversely, apathy and loss of concern [61–62]–may at least
partially be the result of a significant impairment in social
understanding ability [20–21]. Similar although less severe
behaviour abnormalities have been reported in ALS [4] with
irritability and disinhibition [63] and apathy [64]. The deficit in
social cognition reported here may underlie such changes.
Regarding the RME task, ALS patients’ performance either as a
group or as individuals did not differ from healthy controls’
performance. According to the literature, the studies involving
patients with FTD have almost invariably demonstrated an
impaired performance on this task, with the exception of a single
case study [65] which showed a good performance on it. One
could argue that the discrepancy between FTD and ALS patients’
performance on the RME task may depend on the fact that the
stimuli that make up this task may require a ’cognitive integrity’ to
be analysed appropriately that is seriously compromised in FTD
but not in ALS. According to our experimental hypothesis, we
consider the good patients’ performance on the RME as
independent evidence of our prediction, as the RME is a ToM
task not requiring the comprehension of social situations. Further
evidence will be necessary to support this conclusion.
The neuropsychological assessment did not show the presence
of significant differences between ALS patients’ and healthy
controls’ performance on the vast majority of tasks: more precisely,
only the performance on the verbal fluency tasks and the GNT
were significantly different, with patients getting lower scores than
healthy controls, in keeping with previous studies on cognitive
impairment in ALS [2,6–7]. Thus, the patients involved in the
present study did not show the presence of marked cognitive
impairment that could interfere negatively with their performance
on the experimental tasks proposed.
The ALSFRS-R administered to each patients allowed us to
identify the nature of the functional impairment at the time of
testing, with approximately half of the patients (n 6) who presented
with bulbar signs while the others (n 9) presented with upper and
lower limb involvement. As it has been suggested that the presence
of bulbar signs may be related to increased cognitive change by
some studies [40], we compared patients with and without bulbar
signs, although clearly the interpretation is limited by small sample
size. Only the Verbal Fluency Letter task and the Verbal Fluency
index showed a statistically significant difference (bulbar,non-
bulbar), but the performance on the social stories of the ToM task
was impaired in both subgroups relative to controls. Thus, overall
results demonstrated the absence of significant differences in the
cognitive and ToM abilities of the two subgroups of patients
involved in the current study.
It should be noted that our paradigm was adapted from an
experimental protocol previously administered in our series of
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fMRI studies [29–32], which considered physical interaction and
private intention items as two examples of N-SC stories. These two
kinds of items differ from one another as the latter involve a
character, while the former do not. We used this protocol in spite
of this limitation because one of the aims of our present study was
to find convergent neuropsychological evidence in a group of
patients thought to have prefrontal dysfunction with our
neuroimaging findings which demonstrate the prefrontal cortex
plays a crucial role in the comprehension of social situations.
However, even if the comparison in the ALS group of the two
different types of non-social stories resulted in a statistically
significant difference, when the score of the private intentions
items was compared with the averaged score on the social stories, a
statistically significant difference still occurred, allowing us to rule
out the possibility that the different nature of the physical
interaction and private intention items might have played a
significant role in determining the pattern of results of the present
study. Patients were also assessed on the RME task, a task not
requiring the comprehension of social contexts to determine
whether ALS patients’ poor performance is restricted to SC
conditions. Future studies should investigate these findings further
using characters in both physical interaction and private intention
item.
In conclusion, our results provide the first evidence on the
presence of specific deficits in the domain of social understanding
in ALS patients, and support the notion of a link between FTD
and ALS with parallel ToM deficits in both groups indicating
subclinical levels of FTD in some non-demented ALS patients.
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